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1. Introduction 
External recruitment has become the dominant talent management strategy for many firms 
(Cappelli and Keller, 2014). However, external recruitment bears a certain risk as employers 
lack complete information about various candidates’ characteristics, such as productivity, 
motivation, or trustworthiness. The recruitment process itself is used by employers to try to 
uncover as much information as possible about these characteristics.1 Employment relations 
are often investigated using agency theory, which recognizes this information-uncovering 
aspect of the recruitment process (Kiser and Cai, 2003; Shapiro, 2005). Its main focus, 
however, has traditionally been on the agency costs related to different types of agents (i.e., 
different in ‘ability, effort, and honesty’, Kiser, 1999). The argument that agency costs can 
systematically vary across job types (i.e., some jobs ‘allow’ for more discretion than others, 
Goldthorpe, 2000) has not yet been explored in agency theory. This argument is central to 
the present study. 
 In this paper, we focus on the recruitment aspect and investigate what recruitment 
strategies employers undertake to overcome distinct job-related agency problems before 
establishing an employment relationship. More specifically, we will study how employers 
adopt their recruitment strategies to the type of job for which they are hiring in an attempt to 
mitigate the agency problems that may occur for certain job types. Incorporating job 
characteristics in the agency theory literature in this way is important because even though 
agents (i.e., employees) may be of different types, the consequences in terms of agency 
problems may depend more on the job they are asked to perform. For example, an employee 
with a tendency to shirk, may not be able to do so if the output of the job is easily monitored. 
Studies on talent management have shown that when it comes to investment on human 
                                                
1 Our focus here is on external recruitment (see Bonet et al., 2013; Breaugh, 2013; Dineen and Soltis, 2011 for an 
extensive overview of studies on external recruitment). 
. The extensive literature on internal labor markets looks at this process from a different angle (Doeringer and 
Piore, 1971; Althauser, 1989). 
resources, job differentiation is a better strategy than individual differentiation: “staffing 
decisions should take into account the strategic importance of different roles prior to 
considering individual attributes.” (Cappelli and Keller, 2014: 309; Gallardo-Gallardo et al., 
2013; Humphrey et al., 2009). If employers’ recruitment strategies, as part of the staffing 
decisions, are also tailored to job types, this may have important implications for the 
management of human resources. 
 While the neoclassical economics account of agency theory argues that employers will 
make use of the recruitment channel that offers the highest expected profit (Gorter and Van 
Ommeren, 1999), sociological contributions maintain the cost-benefit argument of agency 
theory, but also look at the recruitment process in a broader context (see Shapiro, 2005 for 
an overview). Depending on various structural factors, like occupation, sector of 
employment, or organization size, the efficiency of different recruitment channels also 
varies (Marsden and Campbell, 1990; Marsden, 2001). Social network research shows that 
for many types of jobs, informal recruitment channels (i.e., via social connections) are used 
more frequently than formal ones (e.g., Granovetter, 1974; Montgomery, 1991; Flap and 
Boxman, 2001; Marsden and Gorman, 2001).2 This literature has predominantly focused on 
employees’ social networks. Their main finding is that employee referrals are useful for 
screening new personnel (Rees, 1966; Montgomery, 1991; Fernandez et al., 2000; 
Fernandez and Castilla, 2001; see Breaugh, 2013 for an overview).  
 Here, we focus on a different informal recruitment channel, namely on information 
networks of employers.3 These are social networks in which employers share information 
about prospective workers (Marsden, 2001). Such networks have been studied much less 
(Barron and Bishop, 1985; Marsden, 2001; Flap and Boxman, 2001; Marsden and Gorman, 
2001). The few studies conducted so far argue that one important reason for employers to 
                                                
2 See Mouw (2003) for a critical overview.  
3 For an experimental approach to studying this type of networks, see Schram et al. (2010), Brandts et al. (2010), 
and Gërxhani et al. (2013).  
predominantly use this type of networks when recruiting is that it provides them with in-
depth information on prospective employees. Though such studies on employer networks 
have made important contributions, a systematic analysis of employers’ use of their 
information networks for different kinds of jobs is still missing (Marsden and Gorman, 
2001; Breaugh, 2013). This paper aims to fill this gap. The few studies that have looked at 
occupational differences in selection methods (Marsden, 1994; Boxman et al., 1994; Flap 
and Boxman, 2001; Marsden, 2001) argue that informal recruitment channels will be used 
more often for ‘risky’ occupations (e.g., with damage potential or training costs), because 
they provide more accurate information about prospective employees. According to these 
studies, the primary reason for employers to do so is to economize on costs of selection 
errors.  
We extend this line of argument by comparing jobs that differ with respect to the level 
of discretion. In particular, we will distinguish between ‘managerial, professional and 
specialists’ (MPS) jobs on the one hand, and ‘administrative and supporting’ (AaS) jobs on 
the other (Goldthorpe, 2000). We address the question of which recruitment channels 
employers use for these different types of jobs. By combining insights from agency theory 
(Kiser, 1999; Shapiro, 2005) and the social embeddedness literature (Granovetter, 1985), we 
argue that a variation in the type of channel used can be expected for these two job categories. 
After deriving hypotheses from our theoretical discussion, we subsequently test them using 
data from a large-scale survey of 288 Dutch employers. 
 
2. Formal and informal recruitment channels 
The various recruitment channels that employers can utilize in finding potential employees 
are often categorized in two main groups: (1) formal channels that include public and private 
employment agencies, advertisements, and recruitment from schools and colleges; and (2) 
informal channels that include information from relatives, friends, acquaintances, current 
employees, and other employers (Rees, 1966; Barron and Bishop, 1985; Barber, 1998; 
Marsden, 2001; Fish and Macklin, 2004; Parry and Wilson, 2009).4  
 Most studies argue that an employer’s use of specific recruitment channels is based on a 
cost-benefit analysis (Marsden and Campbell, 1990; Holzer, 1996; Marsden, 2001). In these 
analyses, the following aspects are typically considered: both monetary and time costs 
associated with a particular recruitment strategy, as well as the size of the pool of candidates, 
their quality, and the likelihood of finding an appropriate candidate. Depending on the 
recruitment target and strategy, the costs and benefits associated with the different recruitment 
channels also vary (Russo et al., 2000).  
 While formal recruitment channels offer benefits in terms of a larger pool of potential 
employees (and thus a higher probability of finding the right person), they are often costly. 
There are both pre- and post-hire costs. The pre-hire costs involve financial costs of for 
example placing an advertisement or paying a commission to a private employment agency. 
The post-hire costs are related to the possibility of hiring poor performers whose quality is 
difficult to judge ex ante through the formal channel used. Informal recruitment channels, on 
the other hand, are known for higher benefits and lower costs (Marsden, 2001; Marsden and 
Gorman, 2001). The benefits are mainly related to detailed and accurate information about the 
prospective employee, thus providing good quality employees. This information can be 
transmitted through social connections of the employers or their employees (for the latter, see 
Fernandez et al., 2000; Erickson, 2001; Castilla, 2005). The pre-hire costs are relatively low 
because they do not involve any financial investment like a commission for an ad or agency. 
The process of finding ‘the right person’ may however take a while, which implies greater 
                                                
4 Looking more at the supply side, Bridges and Villemez (1986:576) use another categorization, which to a large 
extent overlaps with the one described here. They distinguish between ‘non-personal’ and ‘personal’ means. The 
non-personal means include the formal channels mentioned above and job seekers’ direct application without 
prior knowledge. The personal means are related to the type of social ties job seekers use to find a job, 
distinguishing between: 1) weak vs. strong ties and (2) work related vs. communal ties.  
time costs. The post-hire costs are related to the limited number of prospective employees 
considered, implying that the employers may miss out on potentially better candidates (Russo 
et al., 2000). Since employers face the uncertainty of not knowing how easily they can reach 
job seekers, they have to decide on how much to invest in increasing the probability of a 
successful search (Russo et al., 2000). The decision whether or not to invest in turn affects the 
choice of recruitment channel(s). In addition, an employer faces the uncertainty of not 
knowing the characteristics of a prospective employee that are deemed important for 
fulfillment of the position.  
 
3. Theoretical discussion 
The level of discretion in jobs, and with that the likelihood of opportunistic behavior of 
employees, varies.5 Goldthorpe (2000) argues that main difference lies in the sources of 
‘contractual hazard’ (Halaby and Weakliem, 1989). From an employer’s perspective, the 
more difficult it is to monitor an employee’s work performance and human capital skills, the 
more contractual hazard is involved in an employment relationship. In order to address the 
various degrees of contractual hazard and the related variation in job discretion, Goldthorpe 
proposes that employers will introduce various forms of employment contracts. For jobs 
characterized by high degrees of discretion, so-called ‘service relationship’ contracts are 
offered. These are considered ‘typical’ for “professional, administrative, and managerial staffs 
of organizational bureaucracies, public and private” (p. 208). For jobs characterized by low 
degrees of discretion, so-called ‘labor contracts’ are offered. These are more typically used in 
case of “manual and lower-grade nonmanual workers” (p. 208).  
 As Goldthorpe (2000:208) himself argues, “these two basic forms of the regulation of 
employment may exist with degrees of modification and that ‘mixed’ forms also occur”. 
                                                
5 This does not necessarily imply that this employee will automatically take advantage and act opportunistically 
(Perrow, 1986; Donaldson, 1990).  
Here, we focus on a slightly modified version of Goldthorpe’s distinction between job types, 
namely between ‘managers, professionals and specialists’ and ‘administrative and 
supporting staff’.6 Below, two theoretical approaches to post-hire costs are examined, 
namely agency theory and social embeddedness theory. 
 
3.1. Agency theory 
According to the “classic economics account of agency theory’’ (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976), an employment relationship between an employer (the principal) and an employee 
(the agent) is characterized by asymmetric information. This is caused by ‘moral hazard’ 
(i.e., the fear of agent shirking) or ‘adverse selection’ (i.e., due to the unknown skills of the 
agent) (Eisenhardt, 1989). In order to cope with these aspects, an employer can try to 
monitor the employee’s work, develop information systems that uncover more information 
about the employee, or offer incentives to the employee. These options are costly however, 
and the employer’s decision on which to choose is thought to be driven by cost 
minimization. One way employers can do this is by addressing these costs before 
establishing an employment relationship, namely in the recruitment phase (Kiser and Cai, 
2003). As Tilly and Tilly (1994: 286) note, hiring involves “transactions in which, within 
stipulated limits, workers concede control over their labor power to employers in return for 
payment stipulated in advance, receiving assignment to specific jobs.” 
 As argued above, agency costs can also vary per job type, meaning that some jobs 
‘allow’ for more discretion than others. Some sociological studies that have looked at 
occupational differences in selection methods argue that when hiring employees for 
permanent or higher-rank jobs, for jobs where additional training is required, or where 
damage potential is high, more careful screening is needed (Barron and Bishop, 1985; 
                                                
6 Note that conceptually, our distinction based on the level of discretion characterizing the two types of jobs is 
maintained. 
Boxman et al., 1994; Flap and Boxman, 2001; Marsden, 1994; 2001). Other HRM studies 
have shown that human resource practices vary per job type within a firm: “jobs that are 
valuable and unique to a company require more sophisticated HR practices”, whereas the 
opposite holds for the less valuable ones (Melián-Gonzalez and Verano-Tacoronte, 2006: 
43). Hence, in the recruitment phase employers may lean more towards personalized 
information transmitted through informal recruitment channels. 
 This argument can be more structurally extended to job types that differ with respect 
to the difficulty of monitoring and the level of human capital skills (i.e., Goldthorpe’s degree 
of discretion). The costs of bridging the informational asymmetry are higher for employers 
in the case of managerial, professional and specialist jobs than in the case of administrative 
and supporting jobs. This is because the former are more difficult to monitor and involve 
higher skill level. Like with the ‘risky’ occupations, mentioned above, informal recruitment 
channels may provide more in-depth information about a candidate. Given the higher level 
of informational asymmetry, this information will be more important for managerial, 
professional and specialist jobs than for administrative and supporting jobs (see Gërxhani et 
al., 2013 for some experimental evidence). Even if there were various ‘social-control 
organizations’ (i.e., formal recruitment channels, e.g., headhunters) that according to 
Shapiro (1987) would provide employers with comparable in-depth information, engaging 
such formal channels would be more costly than utilizing employers’ pre-existing social 
relationships (Marsden, 2001). From the logic of agency theory it follows that when hiring 
externally employers will use the recruitment channels that minimize the bridging costs of 
informational asymmetry. They will therefore use informal recruitment channels relatively 
more often for managerial, professional and specialists jobs than for administrative and 
supporting jobs. In a similar vein, though focusing more on the relationship between 
politicians and top-level bureaucrats, Kiser (1999) argues that the ‘patronage system’ will be 
more preferred when hiring for these top-level agents since it provides better information on 
their types and thus makes it easier to control them (p. 156). This line of reasoning yields the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: When hiring externally, employers use informal recruitment channels 
relatively more often for managerial, professional and specialists jobs than for 
administrative and supporting jobs.  
 
3.2. Social embeddedness 
Studies on human resource management have shown that managers use social networks for 
increasing their knowledge on HRM practices (Sumelius, 2009). Insights from the social 
embeddedness literature (Granovetter, 1985; 1990) will help us better understand the 
relationship between various sources of employers’ information networks and their 
recruitment decisions (i.e., a HRM practice) across job types. The social embeddedness 
perspective argues that economic actions and exchanges are embedded in networks of social 
relationships between parties involved in an exchange (e.g., employer and employee) but 
also other parties (e.g., an employer’s friends or colleagues). Emerging economic structures 
are seen as social constructions and not as automatic responses aimed at minimizing 
transaction costs.  
 According to Shapiro (2005: 276), this “ongoing structure of personal relationships” 
will be used by a principal (i.e., employer) during “agent (i.e., employee) selection, 
monitoring, and sanctioning” to deal with the agency problem of informational asymmetry.7 
Biggart and Castanias (2001) propose an alternative way to diminish agency costs, which is 
                                                
7 In an earlier study she mentions that “common networks of social relations shared by principal and agent may 
provide a sufficient incentive for trust – but not a necessary one.” (Shapiro, 1987: 626). 
by hiring agents with ‘collateralized’ relations8. Like Granovetter (2005), they emphasize that 
these personal relationships may pre-exist and are to a large extent maintained for non-
economic reasons. They can, however, be used to produce intended economic outcomes, like 
minimizing the agency costs of hiring the ‘right’ candidate. For our purpose, this means that 
when deciding to use informal recruitment channels, employers can rely on their own social 
contacts with family, friends, colleagues, neighbors etc. and/or on the social contacts of their 
current employees. As mentioned above, our focus in this paper is on the former, i.e., 
employers’ own information networks. These can influence the recruitment process in two 
ways. One relates to the quantity of the information transmitted about prospective employees. 
The more contacts an employer has, the more candidates will be reached, even (good) ones 
who may otherwise not apply (see Rees, 1961; Fernandez et al., 2000). The second relates to 
the type of information transmitted.  
 Network studies argue that the resources available through contacts vary (Walter and 
Smith-Doerr, 1994). Here, we consider the variation related to the sources of information. 
When the information about a prospective employee is transmitted through an employer’s 
personal relationships with family, friends, neighbors, or non-professional association 
members, the candidate is more likely to be cooperative and trustworthy, and can -through 
these relationships- be easily monitored and sanctioned (Shapiro, 2005). Such social contacts 
provide an employer with in-depth information about a prospective employee for reasons that 
“transcend pure self-interest” (Granovetter, 1992:40). Following the early footsteps of 
Granovetter (1974) and Bridges and Villemez (1986), we will call these social contacts of an 
employer ‘communal type of contacts’.9 “Employers who recruit through social networks 
need not- and probably could not- pay to create the trust and obligations that motivate friends 
and relatives to help one another find employment” (Granovetter, 2005:35).   
                                                
8 These are defined as assets used by agents to assure economic transactions. 
9 A similarity can be found with the concept of ‘strong ties’ (Granovetter, 1973) measured by a role category 
(e.g., kin, friends) and not by the perceived strength of a relationship (Lin, 1999).  
 Another source of information about a prospective employee comes from an employer’s 
social contacts developed in work-related environments like professional associations, former 
jobs, conferences, etc. We will call these ‘work-related type of contacts’. It is not directly 
obvious whether and why these social contacts would provide the requested information. 
Research shows that doing so can even be costly, both in terms of time and effort of 
information provision (Marsden, 2001). In addition, the information provided may be 
unreliable and misleading (Buskens et al., 2010), which Shapiro (1990; 2005) calls ‘the dark 
side of embeddedness’. This indicates another principal-agent relationship, namely one 
between an employer asking for information about a prospective employee and a work-related 
agent being asked to provide such information. Our expectation is that this agency problem 
will be overcome due to reciprocal expectations in the future (Gouldner, 1960; Streeck, 2005; 
Gërxhani et al., 2013), reputation protection (Fernandez et al., 2000), and third-party 
monitoring and sanctioning by other social contacts (Gorski, 1993).  
 Importantly, though both types of an employer’ contacts may be useful in solving the 
agency problem, we predict that the work-related type will be used relatively more often when 
hiring externally for managerial, professional and specialists jobs than for administrative and 
supporting jobs. This is because the information transmitted through the work-related type of 
contacts pertains directly to actual-work related behavior of the prospective employee. “Better 
than the statement that someone is known to be reliable is information from a trusted 
informant that he has dealt with that individual and found him so…” (Granovetter, 1985: 
490). Given the higher level of informational asymmetry, this specific type of information 
will be more important for managerial, professional and specialists jobs than for 
administrative and supporting jobs. This leads to our second hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: When hiring externally, employers make more use of the work-related 
than communal type of contacts for managerial, professional and specialists jobs 
compared to administrative and supporting jobs.  
 
4. Data, Operationalization, and Method 
4.1. Data 
The empirical analysis is based on self-collected data through an online survey of 288 public 
and private organizations in the Netherlands in 2010. These organizations were members of 
the Dutch association of human resource managers. The main respondents were either the 
employers themselves or their representatives responsible for the hiring practices in their 
organization. Before the survey started, internet searches and short phone interviews were 
conducted to identify contact information about the respondents. After acquiring such 
information, the respondents received an email invitation to participate in the survey. A few 
incentives, like winning a prize and receiving access to a benchmarking page were offered in 
case of completing the survey. Non-responses were followed by a maximum of two e-mail 
reminders, as well as phone calls when information was available. After removing incomplete 
and invalid responses, a final dataset was created from the remaining 43.1% valid and 
complete responses, corresponding to 288 different organizations. These organizations 
operate in all sectors of the Dutch economy. Of the organizations in the dataset, 18.9% belong 
to the industry sector, 47.4% to the commercial service sector, and 33.8% to the non-
commercial service sector. This distribution across economic sectors closely resembles the 
distribution across the Dutch economy (16.8% industry, 49.6% commercial services, and 
34.1% non-commercial services) (Statistics Netherlands, 2012).  
 The dataset contains information on the recruitment process of the most recently hired 
employee for managerial, professional and specialists jobs, and of the most recently hired 
employee in administrative and supporting jobs. The majority of respondents (69%) provided 
information about both types of jobs, 7.3% (21 respondents) did so only for administrative 
and supporting jobs, and 23.3% (67 respondents) only for managerial, professional and 
specialists jobs. This amounts to a total of 488 recruitment choices. The data from all 
organizations are analyzed. In addition, separate analyses are conducted for each type of job 
(see section 4.3 below).  For both job types, a number of questions were asked related to the 
number of social contacts of the respondent, and the type of information transmitted through 
such contacts. In addition, a set of background and context questions measured the labor 
market situation at the time of recruitment, together with various characteristics of the 
organization and of the respondent.   
 
4.2. Operationalization  
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable -informal recruitment channels- is measured as follows. In the 
questionnaire, respondents were asked about the channels that they used to find a candidate 
for a job. Respondents were given a list of 12 options and they could select any number of 
these. These 12 options are: (1) public employment agency, (2) private employment agency, 
(3) head hunter, (4) job advertisements, (5) internet, (6) open application, (7) schools and 
training agencies, (8) professional organizations, (9) online networks, (10) friends and family, 
(11) incumbent personnel, and (12) work and business relations. Based on the literature and 
given our focus on the type of information transmitted through these recruitment channels, we 
have grouped the first eight into the category ‘formal recruitment channels’. The latter four 
are grouped into the category ‘informal recruitment channels’. Combining the responses to 
these items thus results in a variable ranging from 0 (none of the channels used) to 12 (all 
channels used). A dummy variable is then created measuring the use of informal recruitment 
channels. This variable has a value of 0 if an employer did not use any of the four informal 
recruitment channels and a value of 1 if an employer used at least one of these channels. 
 
Independent variables 
• Job types 
In this paper we focus on two types of jobs, which are captured by asking the respondents to 
provide information about the most recently hired: (1) Manager, Professional and Specialist 
(MPS), and/or (2) Administrator and Supporting staff (AoS). The variable job type is coded 0 
for AoS and 1 for MPS jobs.  
 
• Social contacts 
To capture social contacts, three indicators are used. The first indicator, number of social 
contacts, measures the quantity of information transmitted about prospective employees. It 
does so by measuring the extent to which respondents know people in other organizations 
with whom they talk about work-related issues. This variable is measured on a scale from 1 
(no one) to 7 (many). The other two indicators capture the type of information transmitted 
about prospective employees. These are measured by asking the respondents to indicate 
whether they have met these people with whom 'they talk about work-related issues’ via: (1) 
professional organizations, (2) employers’ or employees’ associations, (3) branch 
associations, (4) trade unions and entrepreneurial associations, (5) prior jobs, (6) conferences, 
(7) business groups or strategic alliances, (8) clubs, such as Rotary and Lions, (9) online 
networks such as Facebook, LinkedIn, and Hyves, (10) nonprofessional organizations (e.g., 
religion-, art-, sport-related), (11) family, (12) neighborhood. These social contacts are 
grouped into two types: the work-related type of contacts and the communal-related type of 
contacts. The former include contact sources (1) to (6), since they all are related to the day-to-
day work of employers. The latter include contact sources (10) to (12), since they capture 
family and communal related contacts that employers have. Contact source (7) ‘business 
groups’ was only included in the question addressed to private organizations, whereas contact 
sources (8) ‘clubs’ and (9) ‘online networks’ are diffuse and may be both work-related and 
communal-related. For reasons of clarity, these three sources have been omitted from the 
analyses.10 The variable work-related contacts is measured by summing contact sources (1) to 
(6), thus having a range from 0 (the respondent does not have any work-related contacts), to 6 
(the respondent has all work-related contacts). Similarly, the variable communal-related 
contacts is measured by summing contact sources (10) to (12) (ranging from 0 to 3). 
 
Control variables 
• Respondent characteristics 
Earlier research on recruitment practices, on the one hand utilizes organization level data, but 
on the other hand excludes the possibility to control for individual characteristics that 
potentially play a role in the recruitment process. The current dataset enables us to take some 
basic background characteristics into account to investigate whether individuals differ with 
regard to their preference for formal and informal recruitment channels. Provided that existing 
studies cannot serve as a point of reference and that there is not a fully developed theoretical 
framework explaining individual preferences for recruitment channels, this part of the 
analysis is explorative. It focuses on the extent to which there may be individual variation 
with regard to the use of recruitment channels, by including gender (0 = male; 1 = female), 
age, and level of education of the respondent (measured on a five point scale from low to 
high). 
 
• Organizational characteristics 
                                                
10 Additional analyses show that the overall results do not change when placing clubs and online networks in 
either the work-related category or the communal-related contacts. 
In the existing literature on recruitment it has been argued that the use of recruitment channels 
is not purely based on costs and benefits but is also affected by organizational and 
environmental factors (Marsden, 1994; 2001, Rynes and Cable, 2003). Two organization 
characteristics seem to be particularly important when deciding which recruitment channels to 
use. First, there may be a difference between public and private organizations due to 
institutional pressure. Public organizations are more visible to the broader public and the 
environment within which they operate. As such they are more subject to legitimacy issues 
and civil service regulations than private organizations (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Dobbin et 
al., 1988). As a result, public organizations will be less inclined to deviate from the 
recruitment practices that offer equal opportunities to everyone. These are the formal 
recruitment channels since informal channels rely on social connections whose accessibility is 
not equally distributed. To control for this potential variation, a variable measuring whether 
the organization is a public organization, a private organization, or a public/private 
organization is included. Also the size of an organization may matter for the use of 
recruitment channels. The larger the organization, the more financial resources it has to invest 
in more costly recruitment methods (Boxman et al., 1994), and the higher the likelihood that 
its governance structure aims at bureaucratic control and formalization (Pugh and Hickson, 
1976). As a result, larger organizations may use formal recruitment channels relatively more 
often than smaller organizations do. Cassell et al. (2002) show that small and medium sized 
enterprises use indeed the more informal, word of mouth method of hiring the ‘right person’. 
To take this effect into account, a variable organization size (measured by the number of 
employees) is added to the analysis. 
 
• (Perceived) Labor market scarcity 
Another important environmental factor is the labor market situation at the time of 
recruitment (Russo et al., 2000; 2001). In times of excess supply of labor, recruitment will be 
easier since the pool is large. Hence, much less investment is needed to recruit compared to a 
labor market with excess demand of labor. In the latter case, it is more difficult to find 
candidates, leading employers to invest in one or multiple recruitment methods. This means 
that in times of excess demand of labor, employers will use informal recruitment channels 
more often than in times of excess supply. Labor market scarcity is measured by the number 
of weeks that it took to find the candidate that was hired for the job. In addition to this 
objective measure of scarcity, the dataset contains information about perceived labor market 
scarcity. This variable is measured by asking the respondents how easy it was to find the 
candidate that was recently hired. This subjective assessment ranges from 1 (very difficult) to 
7 (very easy). 
 The descriptive statistics of all the variables introduced above are provided in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
4.3. Method 
The dependent variable of this study is a dichotomous variable (the value is either 0 if no 
informal channels were used or 1 if at least one informal channel was used to find the most 
recently hired candidate). Therefore, the hypotheses are investigated using logistic regression 
models. We conduct several analyses to examine the difference in the use of recruitment 
channels between managerial, professional and specialists jobs (MPS) on the one hand, and 
administrative and supporting jobs (AoS) on the other.  
The first step of the analyses focuses on the question whether informal channels are 
used more often when recruiting for managerial, professional and specialists jobs than when 
recruiting for administrative and supporting jobs. This analysis is at first conducted using 
information about both types of jobs (MPS and AoS). By doing so, it provides insights into 
the question whether the use of informal channels varies per job type as predicted in 
Hypothesis 1, even after controlling for the characteristics of the respondent, the organization, 
and the labor market context. The next step investigates Hypothesis 2, and includes variables 
measuring work-related and communal-related type of contacts.  
As mentioned earlier, in some organizations hiring information has been reported for 
both, MPS and AoS job types. In these organizations, the main respondent provided 
information about the recruitment process and the other variables included in the dataset (such 
as organization characteristics and their individual characteristics). This implies that in this 
part of the analysis, the assumption of independence is violated. To deal with this and to 
account for the potential interdependence among the variables, logistic multilevel modeling is 
applied. 
Besides the analysis including both job types simultaneously, a further investigation of 
differences across job types is provided by conducting the same analyses for the two job types 
(MPS and AoS) separately. The joint regression may obscure some empirical relations that 
become visible if single models are investigated. This is particularly the case if there are 
contrasting effects of social contacts for both job types that may lead to suppression in the 
regression models investigating both job types simultaneously. Conducting separate analyses 
overcomes this issue. The data used for these models do not have a nested structure and they 
are analyzed using single level logistic regression analysis.  
 
5. Results 
The results of the multilevel logistic regression analysis are presented in Table 2. These 
results show that organizational characteristics and labor market context affect the use of 
recruitment channels, but the basic background characteristics of respondents do not (Model 
1). As expected, public organizations use informal recruitment channels less often than 
private organizations (b = -0.539; odds ratio = 0.583; p < 0.05). The likelihood of using 
informal recruitment channels also decreases with the organization’s size (b = -0.392; odds 
ratio = 0.676; p < 0.05). These effects remain when the rest of the independent variables are 
added to the model. As for the labor market context, the more employers believe that it is easy 
to find candidates, the less they use informal recruitment channels (b = -0.203; odds ratio = 
0.816; p < 0.01). This effect, however, disappears in model (2) which includes the job type 
dummy, implying that perceived labor market scarcity differs for the two job types.   
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Model 2 of Table 2 investigates the difference in likelihood of using informal recruitment 
channels between the two types of jobs. The results show that the informal recruitment 
channels are more often used for jobs with high degree of discretion (MPS) than for jobs with 
low degree of discretion (AoS) (b = 1.095; odds ratio = 2.974; p < 0.01). Hypothesis 1 is thus 
confirmed.  
 Model 3 of Table 2 tests whether indicators of pre-existing social contacts also play a 
role in the use of informal recruitment channels. The results show that the number of such 
contacts is not significantly related to the use of informal recruitment channels. The type of 
information transmitted through such contacts, on the other hand, is. In particular, having 
work-related type of contacts is significantly associated with more use of informal recruitment 
channels (b = 0.249; odds ratio = 1.283; p < 0.01). A further investigation of these results is 
presented in models 4 and 5. To test Hypothesis 2, we computed interaction effects between 
job type (MPS or AoS) and work-related and communal-related contacts separately to find out 
whether the effects of these contacts differ across job types. As these models show, the effect 
of work-related contacts on the use of informal recruitment channels does not significantly 
differ between the two types of jobs (b = -0.073; n.s.), while the effect of communal-related 
contacts does (b = 0.654; p < 0.01). Hypothesis 2 is thus not supported. 
 Tables 3 and 4 present the results of the same models conducted for the MPS and AoS 
jobs separately. This enables us to further investigate whether the occupationally related 
differences in the use of informal recruitment channels are related to the social contacts 
through which information about the candidates is gathered. The number of these contacts has 
again no significant effect. As for the sources of social contacts, some notable differences 
appear. In the case of managerial, professional and specialists jobs (table 3), work-related 
contacts turn out not to be significantly related to the use of informal recruitment channels. 
Communal-related contacts affect the use of informal channels significantly, however (b = 
0.370; odds ratio = 1.448; p < 0.05). In the case of administrative and supporting jobs (table 
4), we observe the opposite. Work-related contacts are significantly related to the use of 
informal recruitment channels (b = 0.268; odds ratio = 1.307; p < 0.01), while communal-
related contacts are not. Together, these results imply that the effect of communal-related 
contacts on the use of informal channels is suppressed when both types of jobs are analyzed in 
a single model. When studying them separately, we find that pre-existing social contacts are 
important in explaining the occupationally related differences in the use of informal 
recruitment channels. In particular, communal-related type of contacts explain why employers 
use informal channels more often when recruiting for MPS jobs compared to AoS jobs. 
 
Tables 3 and 4 about here 
 
Finally, across the models there are some notable findings concerning the control variables. 
First of all, both background characteristics and labor market context have very limited 
impact on the employers’ use of informal recruitment channels. This is particularly the case 
after considering the job types employers recruit for. Second, both type and size of 
organizations matter for the recruitment channels used: as expected, public organizations and 
larger organizations use informal channels less often. These results reinforce earlier findings 
on the existence of institutional pressure on public organizations, and greater financial 
resources and/or higher degree of formalization in larger organizations. Interestingly, these 
effects turn out to differ for the two types of jobs: while organization size limits the use of 
informal recruitment channels for managerial, professional and specialists jobs, the effect of 
organization type prevails for administrative and supporting jobs. To fully understand these 
observed differences, the underlying mechanisms need to be further investigated. 
Nevertheless, what the outcomes seem to suggest is that financial resources and/or 
formalization play a role in both job types, whereas institutional pressure is only relevant for 
jobs with a low degree of discretion. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Employers’ recruitment strategies are shown to have a crucial role in the functioning of labor 
markets (Marsden, 2001). Various HR strategies, like formal hiring, employee referrals or 
college recruiting, are examined in detail in prior studies, whereas the role of social 
networking has remained under-researched (Breaugh, 2013). This is a significant gap given 
the increasing importance of external recruitment (Cappelli and Keller, 2014) and the 
increasing role of social networking therein (Breaugh, 2013). The present study fills this gap 
by focusing on information networks of employers and investigates how these are used to 
address distinct job-related agency problems before an employment relationship has been 
established. In particular, a job distinction based on the degree of discretion ‘allowed’ in 
performing the job is of relevance here, namely one between ‘managerial, professional and 
specialists’ jobs and ‘administrative and supporting’ jobs (Goldthorpe, 2000). 
Our empirical analyses -which are based on a wide range of information about 
recruitment strategies, jobs, individuals, organizations, and the labor market context- show 
that employers have the tendency to use informal recruitment methods more often for jobs 
with high degree of discretion (i.e., managerial, professional and specialists jobs) than for jobs 
with low degree of discretion (i.e., administrative and supporting jobs). This finding 
contributes to the literature on talent management where job differentiation in staffing 
decisions between more valuable and less valuable jobs is considered to be of strategic 
importance for organizations (Cappelli and Keller, 2014; Melián-Gonzalez and Verano-
Tacoronte, 2006).  
 Moreover, by integrating the social embeddedness literature, this study contributes to a 
better understanding of which types of employers’ social contacts are related to their use of 
informal recruitment channels. The analyses show that while work-related contacts are 
associated with more frequent use of informal recruitment channels, this is not more so for 
managerial, professional and specialists jobs than for administrative and supporting jobs. It is 
the communal-related contacts that seem to be more important for managerial, professional 
and specialists jobs. This finding indicates that employers try to solve the trust problem, 
which is more pressing in jobs with high degree of discretion, by using information from the 
contacts they have outside of their work sphere. The motivation with which family and friends 
provide information overcomes the benefits of accessing various sources of information via 
work. This supports previous arguments related to the strength of ties, originally put forward 
by Granovetter (1982) and later on by Marsden and Gorman (2001). When recruiting for jobs 
with high degrees of uncertainty, the fear that information provided to employers by their 
work-related contacts may be unreliable and misleading seems to be higher than when 
recruiting for jobs with low degrees of uncertainty. This conclusion is in line with earlier 
research showing that social contacts can be a means of overcoming trust problems in 
business transactions (Gulati, 1995; Uzzi, 1997).  
Though this has positive consequences for the demand side of the labor market, there 
is an important downside related to the supply side of the labor market. By primarily relying 
on social contacts, and in particular on ‘strong’ ones, employers restrict some employees’ 
access to certain jobs, generating inequality in the labor market. This may lead to the 
continuation of particular groups’ marginalization, which is a problem of great policy 
relevance. For example, recruiting through social ties is negatively associated with the share 
of women in managerial jobs (Reskin and McBrier, 2000). 
The empirical findings of this study have a number of practical implications  
for the HR strategies and practices of organizations. First of all, as noted above, this study 
emphasizes the importance of job differentiation for the hiring strategies of organizations: the 
likelihood of using formal or informal recruitment channels depends on the kind of job for 
which a candidate is needed. Such differentiation may affect the internal consistency of the 
HR practices used by organizations, which ultimately can affect the performance of 
employees and organizations (Huselid, 1995; Koster, 2011). To retain consistent HR 
practices, organizations could organize all their HR practices following the distinction 
between MPS and AoS jobs. Secondly, the importance of social networks for attracting MPS 
employees implies that organizations should pay careful attention to their informal networks 
as well as the networking skills of employees who are responsible for hiring new staff. Hence, 
if organizations face difficulty in finding MPS personnel, this may be partly due to a shortage 
of informal network ties. By establishing new ties and by developing the networking skills of 
employees, this matching problem may be solved. Finally, the results show that ties with 
families and friends are particularly important for MPS jobs. Such ties are not created 
overnight and need care and attention for a longer period of time. Therefore, organizations 
that depend on such networks for recruitment (e.g. organizations with more MPS jobs), could 
have an advantage compared to other organizations, if they invest in long-term relationships 
between their hiring staff and their non-work related networks.  
There are a number of open questions left that future studies could investigate in more 
detail. To start with, the explanatory variables related to the social embeddedness literature 
can be investigated in much more detail. Such an analysis may be either based on 
experimental designs trying to rule out alternative explanations (see Schram et al., 2010 and 
Gërxhani et al., 2013 for examples), or on qualitative data aiming at understanding 
employers’ recruitment strategies (e.g., Rivera, 2012). Second, the findings with regard to 
organizational characteristics and labor market context, which were only used as control 
variables in the present analysis, raise new questions concerning the recruitment process. For 
example, our analyses can be applied more specifically to small and medium sized enterprises 
like in Cassell et al. (2002). Future research should be geared towards unraveling these effects 
in more detail to better understand the role of social and institutional embeddedness in 
employers’ recruitment strategies. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Mean SD % Min Max 
      
Informal recruitment channels    52 0 1 
      
Job type      
MPS (n = 267)   55 0 1 
AoS (n = 221)   45 0 1 
      
Social contacts of respondent      
Social contacts (number of contacts) 5.20 1.37  1 7 
Work-related contacts 2.66 1.49  0 6 
Communal-related contacts 1.05 0.94  0 3 
      
Respondent characteristics      
Female    56 0 1 
Age  45.40 8.92  24 63 
Education 4.40 0.53  1 5 
      
Organizational characteristics       
Organization type      
Public   31 0 1 
Public/private   21 0 1 
Private   48 0 1 
Organization size  548.73 1018.04  1 9500 
      
Labor market characteristics      
Labor market scarcity (weeks) 27.45 27.36  1 208 
Perceived labor market scarcity 3.41 1.65  1 7 
N = 488 recruitment choices of respondent in 288 organizations 
Table 2. Multilevel logistic regression results (Dependent variable: Informal recruitment 
channels) 
  (1)   (2)   (3)  
 b s.e. Exp(b) b s.e. Exp(b) b s.e. Exp(b) 
          
MPS (1) or AoS (0) 
 
   1.095** (0.248) 2.974 1.154** (0.253) 3.171 
          
          
Social contacts 
 
      -0.008 (0.120) 0.992 
Work-related contacts       0.249** (0.098) 1.283 
Communal-related 
contacts 
      0.118 (0.146) 1.125 
          
Respondent 
characteristics 
         
Gender (1 = female) 
  
0.203 (0.270) 1.225 0.284 (0.302) 1.328 0.259 (0.304) 1.296 
Age 
  
-0.012 (0.015) 0.988 -0.011 (0.016) 0.989 -0.015 (0.017) 0.985 
Education 0.230 (0.239) 1.259 0.300 (0.265) 1.350 0.245 (0.267) 1.278 
          
Organizational 
characteristics 
         
Public organization 
 
-0.539* (0.288) 0.583 -0.584* (0.322) 0.558 -0.514* (0.324) 0.598 
Public/private 
organization 
0.311 (0.332) 1.365 0.360 (0.371) 1.433 0.369 (0.373) 1.446 
Private organization 
(reference) 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Organization size -0.392* (0.181) 0.676 -0.470* (0.203) 0.625 -0.529* (0.211) 0.589 
          
Labor market 
characteristics 
         
Labor market scarcity 0.005 (0.005) 1.005 0.004 (0.006) 1.004 0.004 (0.006) 1.004 
Perceived labor 
market scarcity 
-0.203** (0.086) 0.816 -0.101 (0.097) 0.904 -0.075 (0.098) 0.928 
          
Intercept 0.011 (0.214) 1.011 -0.047 (1.526) 0.954 -0.490 (1.593) 0.613 
          
Variance respondent 0.061 (0.018)  0.070 (0.017)  0.064 (0.017)  
Variance job type 0.172 (0.018)  0.156 (0.017)  0.156 (0.016)  
Note: A total of 488 observations  
Standardized regressions coefficients are reported, standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
Table 2 (continued). Multilevel logistic regression results: (Dependent variable: Informal 
recruitment channels)  
  (4)   (5)  
 b s.e. Exp(b) b s.e. Exp(b) 
       
MPS (1) or AoS (0) 
 
1.380** (0.512) 3.975 0.429 (0.374) 1.536 
       
       
Social contacts 
 
-0.004 (0.120) 0.996 -0.017 (0.123) 0.983 
Work-related contacts 0.286** (0.123) 1.331 0.252** (0.101) 1.287 
Communal-related 
contacts 
0.119 (0.146) 1.126 -0.216 (0.198) 0.806 
       
Interaction effects       
MPS X Work-related 
contacts 
-0.073 (0.144) 0.930    
MPS X Communal-
related contacts 
   0.654** (0.250) 1.923 
       
Respondent 
characteristics 
      
Gender (1 = female) 
  
0.259 (0.305) 1.296 0.250 (0.312) 1.284 
Age 
  
-0.015 (0.017) 0.985 -0.014 (0.017) 0.986 
Education 0.240 (0.267) 1.271 0.225 (0.273) 1.252 
       
Organizational 
characteristics 
      
Public organization 
 
-0.519* (0.325) 0.595 -0.529* (0.332) 0.589 
Public/private 
organization 
0.372 (0.374) 1.451 0.391 (0.384) 1.478 
Private organization 
(reference) 
      
Organization size -0.527* (0.211) 0.590 -0.517* (0.216) 0.596 
       
Labor market 
characteristics 
      
Labor market scarcity 0.004 (0.006) 1.004 0.004 (0.006) 1.004 
Perceived labor 
market scarcity 
-0.071 (0.099) 0.931 -0.104 (0.101) 0.901 
       
Intercept -0.633 (1.622) 0.531 0.101 (1.649) 1.106 
       
Variance respondent 0.064  (0.017)  0.065 (0.017)  
Variance job type 0.155 (0.016)  0.151 (0.016)  
Note: A total of 488 observations  
Standardized regressions coefficients are reported, standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
Table 3. Logistic regression results for managerial, professional and specialists jobs (MPS) 
(Dependent variable: Informal recruitment channels) 
  (1)   (2)  
 b s.e. Exp(b) b s.e. Exp(b) 
       
       
       
Social contacts 
 
   0.069 (0.125) 1.071 
Work-related contacts 
 




   0.370* (0.165) 1.448 
       
Respondent 
characteristics 
      
Gender (1 = female) 
  
0.494 (0.315) 1.639 0.478 (0.325) 1.613 
Age 
  
-0.017 (0.017) 0.983 -0.015 (0.018) 0.985 
Education 
 
0.238 (0.264) 1.269 0.126 (0.271) 1.134 
Organizational 
characteristics 
      
Public organization 
 




0.636 (0.421) 1.889 0.550 (0.427) 1.733 
Private organization 
(reference) 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
Organization size -0.515* (0.213) 0.598 -0.527* (0.223) 0.590 
       
Labor market 
characteristics 
      
Labor market scarcity 
 
0.006 (0.007) 1.006 0.007 (0.007) 1.007 
Perceived labor 
market scarcity 
-0.153 (0.113) 0.858 -0.161 (0.116) 0.851 
       
Intercept 2.068 (1.626) 7.906 ,705 (1.633) 2,024 
       
-2log likelhood  284.257   274.471  
Nagelkerke R2  0.137   0.187  
Note: A total of 267 observations  
Standardized regressions coefficients are reported, standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
Table 4. Logistic regression results for administrative and supporting jobs (AoS) (Dependent 
variable: Informal recruitment channels) 
  (1)   (2)  
 b s.e. Exp(b) B s.e. Exp(b) 
       
       
       
Social contacts 
 
   -0.129 (0.143) 0.879 
Work-related contacts 
 




   -0.176 (0.165) 0.839 
       
Respondent 
characteristics 
      
Gender (1 = female) 
  
-0.141 (0.355) 0.869 -0.181 (0.347) 0.834 
Age 
  
0.001 (0.019) 1.001 -0.008 (0.020) 0.992 
Education 
 
0.211 (0.318) 1.235 0.219 (0.330) 1.245 
Organizational 
characteristics 
      
Public organization 
 




-0.010 (0.393) 0.990 0.142 (0.405) 1.153 
Private organization 
(reference) 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
 













       
Labor market 
characteristics 
      
Labor market scarcity 
 
0.000 (0.006) 1.000 -0.001 (0.007) 0.999 
Perceived labor 
market scarcity 
0.004 (0.117) 1.004 0.042 (0.120) 1.043 
       
Intercept -0.747 (1.825) 0.474 -0.296 (1/911) 0.744 
       
-2log likelihood  246.211   236.145  
Nagelkerke R2  0.074   0.139  
Note: A total of 221 observations  
Standardized regressions coefficients are reported, standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
 
